Forward For WS

conf/config.go

@@ -30,12 +30,16 @@ type Config struct {
 	PermissionConnectorPort      string
 	PermissionConnectorAdminPort string
 
-	// OAuthRedirectURI is the registered OAuth2 redirect_uri (frontend callback URL).
-	// After a successful login, Hydra redirects here with the authorization code.
-	// The original protected URL is passed as the state parameter.
 	AdminOrigin string
 	Origin      string
 
+	// OAuth2ClientID is the client_id registered in Hydra, used to initiate the authorization flow.
+	OAuth2ClientID string
+	// OAuth2AdminClientID is the client_id for the admin frontend.
+	OAuth2AdminClientID string
+
+	// OAuthRedirectURI is the registered OAuth2 redirect_uri (frontend login/callback URL).
+	// Hydra redirects here with login_challenge (login phase) or authorization code (callback phase).
 	OAuthRedirectURI      string
 	OAdminAuthRedirectURI string
 

controllers/oauth2.go

@@ -5,12 +5,14 @@ import (
 	"encoding/json"
 	"fmt"
 	"net/http"
+	"net/url"
 	"oc-auth/conf"
 	"oc-auth/infrastructure"
 	auth_connectors "oc-auth/infrastructure/auth_connector"
 	"regexp"
 	"strconv"
 	"strings"
+	"sync"
 	"time"
 
 	oclib "cloud.o-forge.io/core/oc-lib"
@@ -20,6 +22,48 @@ import (
 	beego "github.com/beego/beego/v2/server/web"
 )
 
+var selfPeerCache struct {
+	sync.RWMutex
+	peer      *model.Peer
+	fetchedAt time.Time
+}
+
+const selfPeerCacheTTL = 60 * time.Second
+
+func getCachedSelfPeer() *model.Peer {
+	selfPeerCache.RLock()
+	if selfPeerCache.peer != nil && time.Since(selfPeerCache.fetchedAt) < selfPeerCacheTTL {
+		p := selfPeerCache.peer
+		selfPeerCache.RUnlock()
+		return p
+	}
+	selfPeerCache.RUnlock()
+
+	pp := oclib.NewRequestAdmin(oclib.LibDataEnum(oclib.PEER), nil).Search(
+		&dbs.Filters{
+			Or: map[string][]dbs.Filter{
+				"relation": {{Operator: dbs.EQUAL.String(), Value: peer.SELF}},
+			},
+		}, strconv.Itoa(peer.SELF.EnumIndex()), false)
+	if len(pp.Data) == 0 || pp.Code >= 300 || pp.Err != "" {
+		return nil
+	}
+	p := pp.Data[0].(*model.Peer)
+
+	selfPeerCache.Lock()
+	selfPeerCache.peer = p
+	selfPeerCache.fetchedAt = time.Now()
+	selfPeerCache.Unlock()
+	return p
+}
+
+// InvalidateSelfPeerCache forces the next call to getCachedSelfPeer to re-fetch from DB.
+func InvalidateSelfPeerCache() {
+	selfPeerCache.Lock()
+	selfPeerCache.peer = nil
+	selfPeerCache.Unlock()
+}
+
 // OAuthController handles OAuth2 login/consent provider endpoints
 type OAuthController struct {
 	beego.Controller
@@ -28,6 +72,7 @@ type OAuthController struct {
 // @Title GetLogin
 // @Description Hydra redirects here with a login_challenge. Returns challenge info or auto-accepts if session exists.
 // @Param   login_challenge   query    string  true  "The login challenge from Hydra"
+// @Param   client_id   query    string  true  "The targetted client_id from Hydra"
 // @Param   redirect   query    string  true  "explicit redirect by passed"
 
 // @Success 200 {object} auth_connectors.LoginChallenge
@@ -37,9 +82,27 @@ type OAuthController struct {
 func (o *OAuthController) GetLogin() {
 	logger := oclib.GetLogger()
 	challenge := o.Ctx.Input.Query("login_challenge")
+	clientID := o.Ctx.Input.Query("client_id")
 	if challenge == "" {
-		o.Ctx.ResponseWriter.WriteHeader(400)
+		// No challenge yet — initiate the OAuth2 flow server-side to get one from Hydra.
-		o.Data["json"] = map[string]string{"error": "missing login_challenge parameter"}
+		// This supports thick clients that cannot follow browser redirects.
+		freshChallenge, err := infrastructure.GetAuthConnector().InitiateLogin(clientID, "")
+		if err != nil {
+			logger.Error().Msg("Failed to initiate login: " + err.Error())
+			o.Ctx.ResponseWriter.WriteHeader(500)
+			o.Data["json"] = map[string]string{"error": err.Error()}
+			o.ServeJSON()
+			return
+		}
+		loginChallenge, err := infrastructure.GetAuthConnector().GetLoginChallenge(freshChallenge)
+		if err != nil {
+			logger.Error().Msg("Failed to get fresh login challenge: " + err.Error())
+			o.Ctx.ResponseWriter.WriteHeader(500)
+			o.Data["json"] = map[string]string{"error": err.Error()}
+			o.ServeJSON()
+			return
+		}
+		o.Data["json"] = loginChallenge
 		o.ServeJSON()
 		return
 	}
@@ -76,8 +139,6 @@ func (o *OAuthController) GetLogin() {
 		o.Data["json"] = redirect
 		o.ServeJSON()
 		return
-
-		return
 	}
 	// Return challenge info so frontend can render login form
 	o.Data["json"] = loginChallenge
@@ -86,7 +147,7 @@ func (o *OAuthController) GetLogin() {
 
 // @Title PostLogin
 // @Description Authenticate user via LDAP and accept Hydra login challenge
-// @Param   redirect   query    string  true  "explicit redirect by passed"
+// @Param   return_mode   query    string  false  "Return mode: 'redirect' (default, 303), 'json' (full object), 'token' (access token string)"
 // @Param   body  body  auth_connectors.LoginRequest  true  "Login credentials and challenge"
 
 // @Success 200 {object} auth_connectors.Redirect
@@ -95,7 +156,10 @@ func (o *OAuthController) GetLogin() {
 // @router /login [post]
 func (o *OAuthController) Login() {
 	logger := oclib.GetLogger()
-	red := o.Ctx.Input.Query("redirect")
+	returnMode := o.Ctx.Input.Query("return_mode")
+	if returnMode == "" {
+		returnMode = "redirect"
+	}
 
 	var req auth_connectors.LoginRequest
 	if err := json.Unmarshal(o.Ctx.Input.CopyBody(10000000), &req); err != nil {
@@ -112,6 +176,13 @@ func (o *OAuthController) Login() {
 		return
 	}
 
+	if req.LoginChallenge == "" {
+		o.Ctx.ResponseWriter.WriteHeader(400)
+		o.Data["json"] = map[string]string{"error": "login_challenge is required in non-local mode"}
+		o.ServeJSON()
+		return
+	}
+
 	// Authenticate via LDAP
 	ldap := auth_connectors.New()
 	found, err := ldap.Authenticate(o.Ctx.Request.Context(), req.Username, req.Password)
@@ -140,6 +211,12 @@ func (o *OAuthController) Login() {
 				ExpiresIn:   3600,
 				AccessToken: "localtoken." + base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(b),
 			}
+			if returnMode == "token" {
+				o.Ctx.ResponseWriter.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/plain")
+				o.Ctx.ResponseWriter.WriteHeader(200)
+				o.Ctx.ResponseWriter.Write([]byte(token.AccessToken))
+				return
+			}
 			o.Data["json"] = token
 		} else {
 			o.Ctx.ResponseWriter.WriteHeader(401)
@@ -149,13 +226,6 @@ func (o *OAuthController) Login() {
 		return
 	}
 
-	if req.LoginChallenge == "" {
-		o.Ctx.ResponseWriter.WriteHeader(400)
-		o.Data["json"] = map[string]string{"error": "login_challenge is required in non-local mode"}
-		o.ServeJSON()
-		return
-	}
-
 	// Accept the login challenge with Hydra
 	redirect, err := infrastructure.GetAuthConnector().AcceptLogin(req.LoginChallenge, req.Username)
 	if err != nil {
@@ -166,14 +236,29 @@ func (o *OAuthController) Login() {
 		return
 	}
 
-	// Return redirect_to so the frontend follows the OAuth2 flow
+	// Return according to requested mode
-	if red == "false" {
+	switch returnMode {
-		o.Data["json"] = redirect
+	case "token", "json":
+		tokenResp, err := completeFlowToToken(redirect.RedirectTo, req.Username, req.LoginChallenge)
+		if err != nil {
+			logger.Error().Msg("Failed to complete OAuth2 flow: " + err.Error())
+			o.Ctx.ResponseWriter.WriteHeader(500)
+			o.Data["json"] = map[string]string{"error": err.Error()}
 			o.ServeJSON()
 			return
 		}
+		if returnMode == "token" {
+			o.Ctx.ResponseWriter.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/plain")
+			o.Ctx.ResponseWriter.WriteHeader(200)
+			o.Ctx.ResponseWriter.Write([]byte(tokenResp.AccessToken))
+			return
+		}
+		o.Data["json"] = tokenResp
+		o.ServeJSON()
+	default: // "redirect"
 		o.Redirect(redirect.RedirectTo, 303)
 	}
+}
 
 // @Title Consent
 // @Description Hydra redirects here with a consent_challenge. Auto-accepts consent with user permissions.
@@ -210,7 +295,6 @@ func (o *OAuthController) Consent() {
 				"relation": {{Operator: dbs.EQUAL.String(), Value: peer.SELF}},
 			},
 		}, strconv.Itoa(peer.SELF.EnumIndex()), false)
-	fmt.Println(pp.Err, pp.Data)
 	if len(pp.Data) == 0 || pp.Code >= 300 || pp.Err != "" {
 		logger.Error().Msg("Self peer not found")
 		o.Ctx.ResponseWriter.WriteHeader(500)
@@ -427,7 +511,10 @@ var whitelist = []string{
 // @router /forward [get]
 func (o *OAuthController) InternalAuthForward() {
 	fmt.Println("InternalAuthForward")
-	uri := o.Ctx.Request.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-Uri")
+	uri := o.Ctx.Request.Header.Get("X-Replaced-Path")
+	if uri == "" {
+		uri = o.Ctx.Request.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-Uri")
+	}
 	for _, w := range whitelist {
 		if strings.Contains(uri, w) {
 			fmt.Println("WHITELIST", w)
@@ -439,6 +526,13 @@ func (o *OAuthController) InternalAuthForward() {
 	origin, publicKey, external := o.extractOrigin(o.Ctx.Request)
 
 	reqToken := o.Ctx.Request.Header.Get("Authorization")
+	if reqToken == "" {
+		// WebSocket upgrade: the browser cannot send custom headers, so the token
+		// is passed as the Sec-WebSocket-Protocol subprotocol value instead.
+		if proto := o.Ctx.Request.Header.Get("Sec-WebSocket-Protocol"); proto != "" {
+			reqToken = "Bearer " + proto
+		}
+	}
 	if reqToken == "" {
 		// Step 1: no token — allow oc-auth's own challenge endpoints (no token needed).
 		// No token and not a whitelisted path → restart OAuth2 flow.
@@ -456,23 +550,33 @@ func (o *OAuthController) InternalAuthForward() {
 	}
 	reqToken = splitToken[1]
 
-	// Step 3: resolve the calling peer — only our own peer (SELF) is authorized.
+	// Step 3: verify the token belongs to our self peer.
-	// A non-SELF or unknown peer is a network/config issue, not a login problem → 401.
+	// Decode the JWT payload and extract ext.peer_id, then compare against the cached self peer UUID.
-	if external || origin == "" || publicKey == "" {
+	// A mismatch means the request comes from a foreign peer → 401 (not a login problem).
-		fmt.Println("Unauthorized", external, origin, publicKey)
+	tokenPeerID := extractPeerIDFromToken(reqToken)
+	selfPeer := getCachedSelfPeer()
+	fmt.Println("TOKEN", tokenPeerID, selfPeer.UUID)
+	if selfPeer == nil || tokenPeerID != selfPeer.UUID {
 		o.Ctx.ResponseWriter.WriteHeader(http.StatusUnauthorized)
 		return
 	}
-
 	// Step 4: introspect via Hydra then check permissions via Keto.
 	//   401 → token inactive/invalid, user must re-authenticate → restart OAuth2 flow.
 	//   403 → token valid, but permissions denied → forbidden.
 	//   200 → all good, let Traefik forward to the target route.
-	switch infrastructure.GetAuthConnector().CheckAuthForward(
+	introspection, permissionKey, code := infrastructure.GetAuthConnector().CheckAuthForward(
 		reqToken, publicKey, origin,
 		o.Ctx.Request.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-Method"),
-		uri, external) {
+		uri, external)
+	switch code {
 	case http.StatusOK:
+		user, _, _ := oclib.ExtractTokenInfo(*o.Ctx.Request)
+		claims := infrastructure.GetClaims().BuildConsentSession(conf.GetConfig().OAuth2ClientID, user, selfPeer)
+		if !claims.EqualClaims(introspection, permissionKey) {
+			fmt.Println("Token is not fresh or compromised")
+			o.Ctx.ResponseWriter.WriteHeader(http.StatusConflict)
+			return
+		}
 		fmt.Println("OK")
 		o.Ctx.ResponseWriter.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
 	case http.StatusForbidden:
@@ -486,17 +590,27 @@ func (o *OAuthController) InternalAuthForward() {
 }
 
 // redirectToLogin redirects the client to Hydra's authorization endpoint to start a fresh
-// OAuth2 flow. The original request URL is passed as the state parameter so the frontend
+// OAuth2 flow. Hydra will generate a login_challenge and redirect to the configured login URL.
-// can redirect back after successful authentication.
 func (o *OAuthController) redirectToLogin(origin string) {
 	cfg := conf.GetConfig()
 
+	var clientID, redirectURI string
 	if strings.Contains(origin, cfg.AdminOrigin) {
-		o.Ctx.ResponseWriter.Header().Set("Location", cfg.OAdminAuthRedirectURI)
+		clientID = cfg.OAuth2AdminClientID
+		redirectURI = cfg.OAdminAuthRedirectURI
 	} else {
-		o.Ctx.ResponseWriter.Header().Set("Location", cfg.OAuthRedirectURI)
+		clientID = cfg.OAuth2ClientID
+		redirectURI = cfg.OAuthRedirectURI
 	}
 
+	hydraAuthURL := fmt.Sprintf("http://%s:%d/oauth2/auth?client_id=%s&response_type=code&redirect_uri=%s&scope=openid",
+		cfg.AuthConnectPublicHost,
+		cfg.AuthConnectorPort,
+		url.QueryEscape(clientID),
+		url.QueryEscape(redirectURI),
+	)
+
+	o.Ctx.ResponseWriter.Header().Set("Location", hydraAuthURL)
 	o.Ctx.ResponseWriter.WriteHeader(http.StatusFound)
 }
 
@@ -589,6 +703,87 @@ func ExtractClient(request http.Request) string {
 	return ""
 }
 
+// completeFlowToToken drives the server-side OAuth2 flow after AcceptLogin.
+// It follows Hydra's redirect to grab the consent_challenge, accepts it,
+// then exchanges the resulting auth code for a token.
+func completeFlowToToken(loginRedirectTo string, subject string, loginChallenge string) (*auth_connectors.TokenResponse, error) {
+	connector := infrastructure.GetAuthConnector()
+
+	// Step 1: follow the login redirect to get the consent_challenge (uses CSRF cookie from InitiateLogin)
+	consentChallenge, err := connector.FollowToConsentChallenge(loginRedirectTo, loginChallenge)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("consent challenge: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	// Step 2: fetch consent challenge details (scopes + client_id)
+	consentDetails, err := connector.GetConsentChallenge(consentChallenge)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("get consent challenge: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	clientID := ""
+	if consentDetails.Client != nil {
+		if cid, ok := consentDetails.Client["client_id"].(string); ok {
+			clientID = cid
+		}
+	}
+
+	// Step 3: get self peer for claims
+	pp := oclib.NewRequestAdmin(oclib.LibDataEnum(oclib.PEER), nil).Search(
+		&dbs.Filters{
+			Or: map[string][]dbs.Filter{
+				"relation": {{Operator: dbs.EQUAL.String(), Value: peer.SELF}},
+			},
+		}, strconv.Itoa(peer.SELF.EnumIndex()), false)
+	if len(pp.Data) == 0 || pp.Code >= 300 || pp.Err != "" {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("self peer not found")
+	}
+	p := pp.Data[0].(*model.Peer)
+
+	// Step 4: accept consent
+	session := infrastructure.GetClaims().BuildConsentSession(clientID, subject, p)
+	consentRedirect, err := connector.AcceptConsent(consentChallenge, consentDetails.RequestedScope, session)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("accept consent: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	// Step 5: follow consent redirect to exchange auth code for token (uses CSRF cookie, cleans up jar)
+	token, err := connector.ExchangeCodeForToken(consentRedirect.RedirectTo, clientID, loginChallenge)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("exchange code: %w", err)
+	}
+	return token, nil
+}
+
+// extractPeerIDFromToken decodes the JWT payload and returns ext.peer_id.
+func extractPeerIDFromToken(token string) string {
+	parts := strings.Split(token, ".")
+	if len(parts) < 2 {
+		return ""
+	}
+	payload := parts[1]
+	switch len(payload) % 4 {
+	case 2:
+		payload += "=="
+	case 3:
+		payload += "="
+	}
+	b, err := base64.URLEncoding.DecodeString(payload)
+	if err != nil {
+		return ""
+	}
+	var claims map[string]interface{}
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(b, &claims); err != nil {
+		return ""
+	}
+	ext, ok := claims["ext"].(map[string]interface{})
+	if !ok {
+		return ""
+	}
+	peerID, _ := ext["peer_id"].(string)
+	return peerID
+}
+
 // extractBearerToken extracts the token from the Authorization header
 func extractBearerToken(r *http.Request) string {
 	reqToken := r.Header.Get("Authorization")

go.mod

@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ require (
 	github.com/go-playground/universal-translator v0.18.1 // indirect
 	github.com/go-playground/validator/v10 v10.22.1 // indirect
 	github.com/golang/snappy v0.0.4 // indirect
+	github.com/google/go-cmp v0.7.0
 	github.com/google/uuid v1.6.0 // indirect
 	github.com/gopherjs/gopherjs v0.0.0-20181017120253-0766667cb4d1 // indirect
 	github.com/goraz/onion v0.1.3 // indirect

go.sum

@@ -57,6 +57,8 @@ github.com/golang/snappy v0.0.4 h1:yAGX7huGHXlcLOEtBnF4w7FQwA26wojNCwOYAEhLjQM=
 github.com/golang/snappy v0.0.4/go.mod h1:/XxbfmMg8lxefKM7IXC3fBNl/7bRcc72aCRzEWrmP2Q=
 github.com/google/go-cmp v0.6.0 h1:ofyhxvXcZhMsU5ulbFiLKl/XBFqE1GSq7atu8tAmTRI=
 github.com/google/go-cmp v0.6.0/go.mod h1:17dUlkBOakJ0+DkrSSNjCkIjxS6bF9zb3elmeNGIjoY=
+github.com/google/go-cmp v0.7.0 h1:wk8382ETsv4JYUZwIsn6YpYiWiBsYLSJiTsyBybVuN8=
+github.com/google/go-cmp v0.7.0/go.mod h1:pXiqmnSA92OHEEa9HXL2W4E7lf9JzCmGVUdgjX3N/iU=
 github.com/google/gofuzz v1.0.0/go.mod h1:dBl0BpW6vV/+mYPU4Po3pmUjxk6FQPldtuIdl/M65Eg=
 github.com/google/uuid v1.6.0 h1:NIvaJDMOsjHA8n1jAhLSgzrAzy1Hgr+hNrb57e+94F0=
 github.com/google/uuid v1.6.0/go.mod h1:TIyPZe4MgqvfeYDBFedMoGGpEw/LqOeaOT+nhxU+yHo=

infrastructure/auth_connector/auth_connector.go

@@ -12,6 +12,9 @@ type AuthConnector interface {
 	Status() tools.State
 
 	// Login/Consent Provider endpoints (Hydra redirects here)
+	// InitiateLogin starts a new OAuth2 flow server-side and returns the login_challenge
+	// generated by Hydra. Useful for thick clients that cannot follow browser redirects.
+	InitiateLogin(clientID string, redirectURI string) (string, error)
 	GetLoginChallenge(challenge string) (*LoginChallenge, error)
 	AcceptLogin(challenge string, subject string) (*Redirect, error)
 	RejectLogin(challenge string, reason string) (*Redirect, error)
@@ -27,12 +30,21 @@ type AuthConnector interface {
 	RevokeToken(token string, clientID string) error
 	RefreshToken(refreshToken string, clientID string) (*TokenResponse, error)
 
+	// Server-side flow completion (for thick clients that cannot follow browser redirects)
+	// FollowToConsentChallenge follows the redirect_to from AcceptLogin to extract the consent_challenge.
+	// loginChallenge is used to replay the CSRF cookie set during InitiateLogin.
+	FollowToConsentChallenge(redirectTo string, loginChallenge string) (string, error)
+	// ExchangeCodeForToken follows the redirect_to from AcceptConsent, extracts the auth code,
+	// and exchanges it for a token at Hydra's token endpoint.
+	// loginChallenge is used to replay the CSRF cookie and is cleaned up after use.
+	ExchangeCodeForToken(redirectTo string, clientID string, loginChallenge string) (*TokenResponse, error)
+
 	// CheckAuthForward validates the token and permissions for a forward auth request.
 	// Returns an HTTP status code:
 	//   200 — token active and permissions granted
 	//   401 — token missing, invalid, or inactive → caller should redirect to login
 	//   403 — token valid but permissions denied → caller should return forbidden
-	CheckAuthForward(reqToken string, publicKey string, host string, method string, forward string, external bool) int
+	CheckAuthForward(reqToken string, publicKey string, host string, method string, forward string, external bool) (*claims.Claims, string, int)
 }
 
 // Token is the unified token response returned to clients

infrastructure/auth_connector/hydra_connector.go

@@ -1,15 +1,19 @@
 package auth_connectors
 
 import (
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"encoding/hex"
 	"encoding/json"
 	"errors"
 	"fmt"
 	"io"
 	"net/http"
+	"net/http/cookiejar"
 	"net/url"
 	"oc-auth/conf"
 	"oc-auth/infrastructure/claims"
 	"strings"
+	"sync"
 
 	oclib "cloud.o-forge.io/core/oc-lib"
 	"cloud.o-forge.io/core/oc-lib/models/peer"
@@ -18,6 +22,7 @@ import (
 
 type HydraConnector struct {
 	Caller     *tools.HTTPCaller
+	cookieJars sync.Map // map[loginChallenge] *cookiejar.Jar
 }
 
 func (h *HydraConnector) Status() tools.State {
@@ -59,6 +64,59 @@ func (h *HydraConnector) getPath(isAdmin bool, isOauth bool) string {
 	return "http://" + host + ":" + port + oauth
 }
 
+// InitiateLogin starts a new OAuth2 authorization flow with Hydra server-side.
+// It calls Hydra's /oauth2/auth endpoint without following the redirect, then extracts
+// the login_challenge from the Location header. For thick clients that cannot follow
+// browser redirects.
+func (h *HydraConnector) InitiateLogin(clientID string, redirectURI string) (string, error) {
+	stateBytes := make([]byte, 16)
+	if _, err := rand.Read(stateBytes); err != nil {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to generate state: %w", err)
+	}
+	state := hex.EncodeToString(stateBytes)
+
+	params := fmt.Sprintf("client_id=%s&response_type=code&scope=openid&state=%s",
+		url.QueryEscape(clientID), state)
+	if redirectURI != "" {
+		params += "&redirect_uri=" + url.QueryEscape(redirectURI)
+	}
+	authURL := h.getPath(false, false) + "/oauth2/auth?" + params
+
+	jar, _ := cookiejar.New(nil)
+	client := &http.Client{
+		Jar: jar,
+		CheckRedirect: func(req *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error {
+			return http.ErrUseLastResponse // do not follow redirects
+		},
+	}
+
+	resp, err := client.Get(authURL)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to initiate login with Hydra: %w", err)
+	}
+	defer resp.Body.Close()
+
+	location := resp.Header.Get("Location")
+	if location == "" {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("hydra did not return a redirect location (status %d)", resp.StatusCode)
+	}
+
+	parsed, err := url.Parse(location)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to parse redirect location: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	challenge := parsed.Query().Get("login_challenge")
+	if challenge == "" {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("login_challenge not found in redirect location: %s", location)
+	}
+
+	// Save the cookie jar so server-side flow completion can reuse the CSRF cookie
+	h.cookieJars.Store(challenge, jar)
+
+	return challenge, nil
+}
+
 // GetLoginChallenge retrieves login challenge details from Hydra admin API
 func (h *HydraConnector) GetLoginChallenge(challenge string) (*LoginChallenge, error) {
 	logger := oclib.GetLogger()
@@ -303,14 +361,14 @@ func (h *HydraConnector) RefreshToken(refreshToken string, clientID string) (*To
 // It introspects the token via Hydra then checks permissions via Keto.
 // Only requests from our own peer (external == false) are accepted.
 // Returns 200 (OK), 401 (token inactive/invalid → redirect to login), or 403 (permission denied).
-func (h *HydraConnector) CheckAuthForward(reqToken string, publicKey string, host string, method string, forward string, external bool) int {
+func (h *HydraConnector) CheckAuthForward(reqToken string, publicKey string, host string, method string, forward string, external bool) (*claims.Claims, string, int) {
 	if forward == "" || method == "" {
-		return http.StatusUnauthorized
+		return nil, "", http.StatusUnauthorized
 	}
 	// Defense in depth: only SELF peer requests are allowed.
-	if external {
+	/*if external {
 		return http.StatusUnauthorized
-	}
+	}*/
 	logger := oclib.GetLogger()
 
 	// Introspect the token via Hydra.
@@ -320,7 +378,7 @@ func (h *HydraConnector) CheckAuthForward(reqToken string, publicKey string, hos
 		if err != nil {
 			logger.Error().Msg("Forward auth introspect failed: " + err.Error())
 		}
-		return http.StatusUnauthorized
+		return nil, "", http.StatusUnauthorized
 	}
 
 	// Build session claims from Hydra's introspection "ext" field.
@@ -345,15 +403,147 @@ func (h *HydraConnector) CheckAuthForward(reqToken string, publicKey string, hos
 
 	// Check permissions via Keto.
 	// A valid token with insufficient permissions → 403 (authenticated, not authorized).
-	ok, err := claims.GetClaims().DecodeClaimsInToken(host, method, forward, sessionClaims, publicKey, external)
+	ok, permKey, err := claims.GetClaims().DecodeClaimsInToken(host, method, forward, sessionClaims, publicKey, external)
 	if err != nil {
 		logger.Error().Msg("Failed to decode claims in forward auth: " + err.Error())
-		return http.StatusForbidden
+		return nil, "", http.StatusForbidden
 	}
 	if !ok {
-		return http.StatusForbidden
+		return nil, "", http.StatusForbidden
 	}
-	return http.StatusOK
+	return &sessionClaims, permKey, http.StatusOK
+}
+
+// FollowToConsentChallenge follows the redirect_to returned by AcceptLogin.
+// Hydra redirects once to the consent URL — this extracts the consent_challenge from it.
+// loginChallenge is used to retrieve the CSRF cookie jar saved during InitiateLogin.
+func (h *HydraConnector) FollowToConsentChallenge(redirectTo string, loginChallenge string) (string, error) {
+	// The redirect_to URL uses the public host (via reverse proxy).
+	// Rewrite it to hit Hydra directly using its internal address.
+	internalURL, err := rewriteToInternalHydra(h, redirectTo)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to rewrite redirect URL: %w", err)
+	}
+	var jar http.CookieJar
+	if v, ok := h.cookieJars.Load(loginChallenge); ok {
+		jar = v.(*cookiejar.Jar)
+	}
+	client := &http.Client{
+		Jar: jar,
+		CheckRedirect: func(req *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error {
+			return http.ErrUseLastResponse
+		},
+	}
+	resp, err := client.Get(internalURL)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to follow login redirect: %w", err)
+	}
+	defer resp.Body.Close()
+	location := resp.Header.Get("Location")
+	if location == "" {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("no redirect location after following login redirect (status %d)", resp.StatusCode)
+	}
+	parsed, err := url.Parse(location)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to parse consent redirect: %w", err)
+	}
+	challenge := parsed.Query().Get("consent_challenge")
+	if challenge == "" {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("consent_challenge not found in redirect: %s", location)
+	}
+	return challenge, nil
+}
+
+// ExchangeCodeForToken follows the redirect_to returned by AcceptConsent to extract the
+// authorization code, then exchanges it for a token at Hydra's token endpoint.
+// loginChallenge is used to retrieve the CSRF cookie jar and clean it up after use.
+func (h *HydraConnector) ExchangeCodeForToken(redirectTo string, clientID string, loginChallenge string) (*TokenResponse, error) {
+	internalURL, err := rewriteToInternalHydra(h, redirectTo)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to rewrite redirect URL: %w", err)
+	}
+	var jar http.CookieJar
+	if v, ok := h.cookieJars.Load(loginChallenge); ok {
+		jar = v.(*cookiejar.Jar)
+	}
+	client := &http.Client{
+		Jar: jar,
+		CheckRedirect: func(req *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error {
+			return http.ErrUseLastResponse
+		},
+	}
+	resp, err := client.Get(internalURL)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to follow consent redirect: %w", err)
+	}
+	defer resp.Body.Close()
+	location := resp.Header.Get("Location")
+	if location == "" {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("no redirect after consent (status %d)", resp.StatusCode)
+	}
+	parsed, err := url.Parse(location)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to parse code redirect: %w", err)
+	}
+	code := parsed.Query().Get("code")
+	if code == "" {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("code not found in redirect: %s", location)
+	}
+	// Reconstruct redirect_uri without query/fragment — must match the registered value
+	parsed.RawQuery = ""
+	parsed.Fragment = ""
+	redirectURI := parsed.String()
+
+	cfg := conf.GetConfig()
+	vals := url.Values{}
+	vals.Add("grant_type", "authorization_code")
+	vals.Add("code", code)
+	vals.Add("client_id", clientID)
+	vals.Add("client_secret", cfg.ClientSecret)
+	vals.Add("redirect_uri", redirectURI)
+	resp2, err := h.Caller.CallForm(http.MethodPost, h.getPath(false, true), "/token", vals,
+		"application/x-www-form-urlencoded", true)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to exchange code for token: %w", err)
+	}
+	defer resp2.Body.Close()
+	b, err := io.ReadAll(resp2.Body)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	if resp2.StatusCode >= 300 {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("token exchange failed (%s): %s", resp2.Status, string(b))
+	}
+	var result TokenResponse
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(b, &result); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	// Cookie jar no longer needed — clean up
+	h.cookieJars.Delete(loginChallenge)
+	return &result, nil
+}
+
+// rewriteToInternalHydra rewrites a public-facing Hydra URL to use the internal Hydra address.
+// The redirect_to from Hydra uses the public host/port (possibly behind a reverse proxy),
+// but server-side follow-ups must hit Hydra directly.
+// It keeps the path suffix after "/oauth2" and the full query string.
+func rewriteToInternalHydra(h *HydraConnector, publicURL string) (string, error) {
+	parsed, err := url.Parse(publicURL)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("invalid redirect URL: %w", err)
+	}
+	// Extract the path segment from "/oauth2" onward (e.g. "/oauth2/auth")
+	const marker = "/oauth2"
+	idx := strings.Index(parsed.Path, marker)
+	if idx < 0 {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("redirect URL has no /oauth2 path segment: %s", publicURL)
+	}
+	suffix := parsed.Path[idx:] // e.g. "/oauth2/auth"
+	internal := h.getPath(false, false) + suffix
+	if parsed.RawQuery != "" {
+		internal += "?" + parsed.RawQuery
+	}
+	return internal, nil
 }
 
 // extractBearerToken extracts the token from a "Bearer xxx" Authorization header value

infrastructure/claims/claims.go

@@ -1,10 +1,13 @@
 package claims
 
 import (
+	"fmt"
 	"oc-auth/conf"
+	"reflect"
 	"strings"
 
 	"cloud.o-forge.io/core/oc-lib/models/peer"
+	"github.com/google/go-cmp/cmp"
 )
 
 // ClaimService builds and verifies OAuth2 session claims
@@ -14,7 +17,7 @@ type ClaimService interface {
 	BuildConsentSession(clientID string, userId string, peer *peer.Peer) Claims
 
 	// DecodeClaimsInToken verifies permissions from claims extracted from a JWT
-	DecodeClaimsInToken(host string, method string, forward string, sessionClaims Claims, publicKey string, external bool) (bool, error)
+	DecodeClaimsInToken(host string, method string, forward string, sessionClaims Claims, publicKey string, external bool) (bool, string, error)
 }
 
 // SessionClaims contains access_token and id_token claim maps
@@ -32,6 +35,88 @@ var t = map[string]ClaimService{
 	"hydra": HydraClaims{},
 }
 
+func cleanMap(m map[string]interface{}) map[string]interface{} {
+	if m == nil {
+		return map[string]interface{}{}
+	}
+
+	ignored := map[string]bool{
+		"exp": true,
+		"iat": true,
+		"nbf": true,
+	}
+
+	out := make(map[string]interface{})
+
+	for k, v := range m {
+		if ignored[k] {
+			continue
+		}
+
+		switch val := v.(type) {
+		case map[string]interface{}:
+			out[k] = cleanMap(val)
+		default:
+			out[k] = val
+		}
+	}
+
+	return out
+}
+
+func (c *Claims) EqualExt(ext map[string]interface{}) bool {
+	claims := &Claims{}
+	claims.SessionFromExt(ext)
+
+	return c.EqualClaims(claims)
+}
+
+func (c *Claims) EqualClaims(claims *Claims, permsKey ...string) bool {
+	c.normalizeClaims()
+	claims.normalizeClaims()
+
+	if len(permsKey) > 0 {
+		for _, p := range permsKey {
+			if !(claims.Session.AccessToken[p] != nil && c.Session.AccessToken[p] != nil && claims.Session.AccessToken[p] == c.Session.AccessToken[p]) {
+				return false
+			}
+		}
+		return true
+	}
+	ok := reflect.DeepEqual(c.Session, claims.Session)
+	if !ok {
+		fmt.Println(cmp.Diff(c.Session, claims.Session))
+	}
+	return ok
+}
+
+func (c *Claims) normalizeClaims() {
+	c.Session.AccessToken = cleanMap(c.Session.AccessToken)
+	c.Session.IDToken = cleanMap(c.Session.IDToken)
+}
+
+func (c *Claims) SessionFromExt(ext map[string]interface{}) {
+	var access map[string]interface{}
+	var id map[string]interface{}
+
+	if v, ok := ext["access_token"].(map[string]interface{}); ok && v != nil {
+		access = v
+	} else {
+		access = map[string]interface{}{}
+	}
+
+	if v, ok := ext["id_token"].(map[string]interface{}); ok && v != nil {
+		id = v
+	} else {
+		id = map[string]interface{}{}
+	}
+
+	c.Session = SessionClaims{
+		AccessToken: access,
+		IDToken:     id,
+	}
+}
+
 func GetClaims() ClaimService {
 	for k := range t {
 		if strings.Contains(conf.GetConfig().Auth, k) {

infrastructure/claims/hydra_claims.go

@@ -81,22 +81,21 @@ func (h HydraClaims) clearBlank(path []string) []string {
 }
 
 // DecodeClaimsInToken verifies permissions from claims in a standard JWT (via introspection)
-func (h HydraClaims) DecodeClaimsInToken(host string, method string, forward string, sessionClaims Claims, publicKey string, external bool) (bool, error) {
+func (h HydraClaims) DecodeClaimsInToken(host string, method string, forward string, sessionClaims Claims, publicKey string, external bool) (bool, string, error) {
 	logger := oclib.GetLogger()
 	idTokenClaims := sessionClaims.Session.IDToken
 
 	// Signature verification: skip if signature is empty (internal requests)
 	if sig, ok := idTokenClaims["signature"].(string); ok && sig != "" {
 		if ok, err := h.DecodeSignature(host, sig, publicKey); !ok {
-			return false, err
+			return false, "", err
 		}
 	}
 
 	claims := sessionClaims.Session.AccessToken
 	if claims == nil {
-		return false, errors.New("no access_token claims found")
+		return false, "", errors.New("no access_token claims found")
 	}
-
 	path := strings.ReplaceAll(forward, "http://"+host, "")
 	splittedPath := h.clearBlank(strings.Split(path, "/"))
 
@@ -105,11 +104,11 @@ func (h HydraClaims) DecodeClaimsInToken(host string, method string, forward str
 		if !ok {
 			continue
 		}
-		match := true
 		splittedP := h.clearBlank(strings.Split(pStr, "/"))
 		if len(splittedP) != len(splittedPath) {
 			continue
 		}
+		match := true
 		for i, v := range splittedP {
 			if strings.Contains(v, ":") { // is a param
 				continue
@@ -127,11 +126,11 @@ func (h HydraClaims) DecodeClaimsInToken(host string, method string, forward str
 				Relation: "permits" + strings.ToUpper(meth.String()),
 				Object:   pStr,
 			}
-			return perms_connectors.GetPermissionConnector("").CheckPermission(perm, nil, true), nil
+			return perms_connectors.GetPermissionConnector("").CheckPermission(perm, nil, true), m, nil
 		}
 	}
 	logger.Error().Msg("No permission found for " + method + " " + forward)
-	return false, errors.New("no permission found")
+	return false, "", errors.New("no permission found")
 }
 
 // BuildConsentSession builds the session payload for Hydra consent accept.
@@ -162,7 +161,9 @@ func (h HydraClaims) BuildConsentSession(clientID string, userId string, p *peer
 		return c
 	}
 
-	c.Session.IDToken["username"] = userId
+	c.Session.AccessToken["peer_id"] = p.UUID
+
+	c.Session.IDToken["user_id"] = userId
 	c.Session.IDToken["peer_id"] = p.UUID
 	c.Session.IDToken["client_id"] = clientID
 
@@ -172,6 +173,13 @@ func (h HydraClaims) BuildConsentSession(clientID string, userId string, p *peer
 		return c
 	}
 	c.Session.IDToken["groups"] = groups
+
+	roles, err := perms_connectors.KetoConnector{}.GetRoleByUser(userId)
+	if err != nil {
+		logger.Error().Msg("Failed to get roles for user " + userId + ": " + err.Error())
+		return c
+	}
+	c.Session.IDToken["roles"] = roles
 	c.Session.IDToken["signature"] = sign
 	return c
 }

infrastructure/perms_connectors/keto_connector.go

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ import (
 	"fmt"
 	"oc-auth/conf"
 	"oc-auth/infrastructure/utils"
+	"strings"
 
 	oclib "cloud.o-forge.io/core/oc-lib"
 	"cloud.o-forge.io/core/oc-lib/tools"
@@ -128,8 +129,12 @@ func (k KetoConnector) CreatePermission(permID string, relation string, internal
 	if err != nil {
 		return "", 422, err
 	}
-	k.BindPermission("admin", permID, "permits"+meth.String())
+	id, code, err := k.creates(permID, "permits"+meth.String(), k.scope())
-	return k.creates(permID, "permits"+meth.String(), k.scope())
+	if err != nil && !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "already exist") {
+		return id, code, err
+	}
+	k.BindPermission(conf.GetConfig().AdminRole, permID, "permits"+meth.String())
+	return id, code, nil
 }
 
 func (k KetoConnector) creates(object string, relation string, subject string) (string, int, error) {

main.go

@@ -45,6 +45,8 @@ func main() {
 	conf.GetConfig().Origin = o.GetStringDefault("ADMIN_ORIGIN", "http://localhost:8000")
 	conf.GetConfig().AdminOrigin = o.GetStringDefault("ADMIN_ORIGIN", "http://localhost:8001")
 
+	conf.GetConfig().OAuth2ClientID = o.GetStringDefault("OAUTH2_CLIENT_ID", "oc-auth")
+	conf.GetConfig().OAuth2AdminClientID = o.GetStringDefault("OAUTH2_ADMIN_CLIENT_ID", "oc-auth-admin")
 	conf.GetConfig().OAuthRedirectURI = o.GetStringDefault("OAUTH_REDIRECT_URI", "http://localhost:8000/l")
 	conf.GetConfig().OAdminAuthRedirectURI = o.GetStringDefault("ADMIN_OAUTH_REDIRECT_URI", "http://localhost:8000/l")
 	conf.GetConfig().Local = o.GetBoolDefault("LOCAL", true)
@@ -110,7 +112,6 @@ func discovery() {
 			if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "already exist") {
 				logger.Error().Msg("Failed to create admin role, retrying in 10s: " + err.Error())
 				time.Sleep(10 * time.Second)
-				continue
 			}
 		}
 		if _, _, err := conn.BindRole(conf.GetConfig().AdminRole, "admin"); err != nil {
@@ -121,6 +122,7 @@ func discovery() {
 			json.Unmarshal(m.Payload, &resp)
 			for k, v := range resp {
 				for _, p := range v {
+					conn.DeletePermission(k, p.(string), true)
 					if _, _, err := conn.CreatePermission(k, p.(string), true); err != nil {
 						logger.Error().Msg("Failed to admin create permission: " + err.Error())
 					}