Complete and refine OAuth + Traeffik Restriction

2026-02-20 10:30:34 +01:00
parent 078aae8172
commit 979747e288
10 changed files with 171 additions and 84 deletions
--- a/conf/config.go
+++ b/conf/config.go
@@ -30,6 +30,15 @@ type Config struct {
 	PermissionConnectorPort      string
 	PermissionConnectorAdminPort string

+	// OAuthRedirectURI is the registered OAuth2 redirect_uri (frontend callback URL).
+	// After a successful login, Hydra redirects here with the authorization code.
+	// The original protected URL is passed as the state parameter.
+	AdminOrigin string
+	Origin      string
+
+	OAuthRedirectURI      string
+	OAdminAuthRedirectURI string
+
 	Local bool
 }

--- a/controllers/oauth2.go
+++ b/controllers/oauth2.go
@@ -374,48 +374,104 @@ func (o *OAuthController) Introspect() {
 	o.ServeJSON()
 }

+// whitelist lists path segments of oc-auth's own challenge endpoints.
+// These require no token — the challenge is passed as a query parameter by Hydra.
 var whitelist = []string{
+	"/public/",
+	"/version",
+	"/status",
 	"/login",
+	"/logout",
 	"/refresh",
 	"/introspect",
 	"/consent",
 }

 // @Title AuthForward
-// @Description Forward auth for Traefik — validates JWT via Hydra introspection
+// @Description Forward auth for Traefik — validates JWT via Hydra introspection.
+// Only requests from our own peer (SELF) are authorized.
+// Routes in pathWhitelist bypass all checks (with or without token).
+// Routes in whitelist bypass the token check (oc-auth own challenge endpoints).
+// On missing/invalid token: 302 to Hydra authorization URL (restart OAuth2 flow).
+// On wrong peer: 401 (network/config issue, no redirect).
+// On valid token but insufficient permissions: 403.
+// On success: 200 so Traefik forwards the request to the target route.
 // @Param   Authorization  header  string  false  "Bearer token"
 // @Success 200 {string}
 // @router /forward [get]
 func (o *OAuthController) InternalAuthForward() {
+	fmt.Println("InternalAuthForward")
+	uri := o.Ctx.Request.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-Uri")
+	for _, w := range whitelist {
+		if strings.Contains(uri, w) {
+			fmt.Println("WHITELIST", w)
+			o.Ctx.ResponseWriter.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+			return
+		}
+	}
+
+	origin, publicKey, external := o.extractOrigin(o.Ctx.Request)
+
 	reqToken := o.Ctx.Request.Header.Get("Authorization")
 	if reqToken == "" {
-		for _, w := range whitelist {
-			if strings.Contains(o.Ctx.Request.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-Uri"), w) {
-				o.Ctx.ResponseWriter.WriteHeader(200)
-				o.ServeJSON()
-				return
-			}
-		}
-		o.Ctx.ResponseWriter.WriteHeader(401)
-		o.ServeJSON()
+		// Step 1: no token — allow oc-auth's own challenge endpoints (no token needed).
+		// No token and not a whitelisted path → restart OAuth2 flow.
+		fmt.Println("NO TOKEN")
+		o.redirectToLogin(origin)
 		return
 	}
+
+	// Step 2: extract Bearer token — malformed header treated as missing token.
 	splitToken := strings.Split(reqToken, "Bearer ")
-	if len(splitToken) < 2 {
-		reqToken = ""
-	} else {
-		reqToken = splitToken[1]
+	if len(splitToken) < 2 || splitToken[1] == "" {
+		fmt.Println("MALFORMED BEARER")
+		o.redirectToLogin(origin)
+		return
 	}
-	origin, publicKey, external := o.extractOrigin(o.Ctx.Request)
-	if !infrastructure.GetAuthConnector().CheckAuthForward(
+	reqToken = splitToken[1]
+
+	// Step 3: resolve the calling peer — only our own peer (SELF) is authorized.
+	// A non-SELF or unknown peer is a network/config issue, not a login problem → 401.
+	if external || origin == "" || publicKey == "" {
+		fmt.Println("Unauthorized", external, origin, publicKey)
+		o.Ctx.ResponseWriter.WriteHeader(http.StatusUnauthorized)
+		return
+	}
+
+	// Step 4: introspect via Hydra then check permissions via Keto.
+	//   401 → token inactive/invalid, user must re-authenticate → restart OAuth2 flow.
+	//   403 → token valid, but permissions denied → forbidden.
+	//   200 → all good, let Traefik forward to the target route.
+	switch infrastructure.GetAuthConnector().CheckAuthForward(
 		reqToken, publicKey, origin,
 		o.Ctx.Request.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-Method"),
-		o.Ctx.Request.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-Uri"), external) && origin != "" && publicKey != "" {
-		o.Ctx.ResponseWriter.WriteHeader(401)
-		o.ServeJSON()
-		return
+		uri, external) {
+	case http.StatusOK:
+		fmt.Println("OK")
+		o.Ctx.ResponseWriter.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+	case http.StatusForbidden:
+		fmt.Println("StatusForbidden")
+		o.Ctx.ResponseWriter.WriteHeader(http.StatusForbidden)
+	default:
+		fmt.Println("redirectToLogin UNAUTHORIZED")
+		// 401 or unexpected status → token likely expired, restart the OAuth2 flow.
+		o.redirectToLogin(origin)
 	}
-	o.ServeJSON()
+}
+
+// redirectToLogin redirects the client to Hydra's authorization endpoint to start a fresh
+// OAuth2 flow. The original request URL is passed as the state parameter so the frontend
+// can redirect back after successful authentication.
+func (o *OAuthController) redirectToLogin(origin string) {
+	cfg := conf.GetConfig()
+
+	if strings.Contains(origin, cfg.AdminOrigin) {
+		o.Ctx.ResponseWriter.Header().Set("Location", cfg.OAdminAuthRedirectURI)
+	} else {
+		o.Ctx.ResponseWriter.Header().Set("Location", cfg.OAuthRedirectURI)
+	}
+
+	o.Ctx.ResponseWriter.WriteHeader(http.StatusFound)
 }

 func (o *OAuthController) extractOrigin(request *http.Request) (string, string, bool) {
--- a/docker-compose.yml
+++ b/docker-compose.yml
@@ -8,13 +8,15 @@ services:
    container_name: oc-auth
    labels:
      - "traefik.enable=true"
-      - "traefik.http.routers.auth.entrypoints=web"
-      - "traefik.http.routers.auth.rule=PathPrefix(`/auth`)"
-      - "traefik.http.middlewares.auth-rewrite.replacepathregex.regex=^/auth(.*)"
-      - "traefik.http.middlewares.auth-rewrite.replacepathregex.replacement=/oc$$1"
-      - "traefik.http.routers.auth.middlewares=auth-rewrite"
-      - "traefik.http.services.auth.loadbalancer.server.port=8080"
-      - "traefik.http.middlewares.auth.forwardauth.address=http://oc-auth:8080/oc/forward"
+      - "traefik.http.routers.auth-sec.entrypoints=web"
+      - "traefik.http.routers.auth-sec.rule=PathPrefix(`/auth/`)"
+      - "traefik.http.middlewares.auth-sec-rewrite.replacepathregex.regex=^/auth(.*)"
+      - "traefik.http.middlewares.auth-sec-rewrite.replacepathregex.replacement=/oc$$1"
+      - "traefik.http.services.auth-sec.loadbalancer.server.port=8080"
+      - "traefik.http.routers.auth-sec.middlewares=auth-sec-rewrite,auth-auth-sec"
+      - "traefik.http.middlewares.auth-auth-sec.forwardauth.address=http://hydra:4444/oauth2/auth"
+      - "traefik.http.middlewares.auth-auth-sec.forwardauth.trustForwardHeader=true"
+      - "traefik.http.middlewares.auth-auth-sec.forwardauth.authResponseHeaders=X-Auth-Request-User,X-Auth-Request-Email"
    environment:
          LDAP_ENDPOINTS: ldap:389
          LDAP_BINDDN: cn=admin,dc=example,dc=com
--- a/infrastructure/auth_connector/auth_connector.go
+++ b/infrastructure/auth_connector/auth_connector.go
@@ -27,8 +27,12 @@ type AuthConnector interface {
 	RevokeToken(token string, clientID string) error
 	RefreshToken(refreshToken string, clientID string) (*TokenResponse, error)

-	// Forward auth
-	CheckAuthForward(reqToken string, publicKey string, host string, method string, forward string, external bool) bool
+	// CheckAuthForward validates the token and permissions for a forward auth request.
+	// Returns an HTTP status code:
+	//   200 — token active and permissions granted
+	//   401 — token missing, invalid, or inactive → caller should redirect to login
+	//   403 — token valid but permissions denied → caller should return forbidden
+	CheckAuthForward(reqToken string, publicKey string, host string, method string, forward string, external bool) int
 }

 // Token is the unified token response returned to clients
--- a/infrastructure/auth_connector/hydra_connector.go
+++ b/infrastructure/auth_connector/hydra_connector.go
@@ -299,61 +299,61 @@ func (h *HydraConnector) RefreshToken(refreshToken string, clientID string) (*To
 	return &result, nil
 }

-// CheckAuthForward validates a JWT token for forward auth (Traefik integration)
-// It introspects the token via Hydra and checks permissions from the token's extra claims
-func (h *HydraConnector) CheckAuthForward(reqToken string, publicKey string, host string, method string, forward string, external bool) bool {
+// CheckAuthForward validates a JWT token for forward auth (Traefik integration).
+// It introspects the token via Hydra then checks permissions via Keto.
+// Only requests from our own peer (external == false) are accepted.
+// Returns 200 (OK), 401 (token inactive/invalid → redirect to login), or 403 (permission denied).
+func (h *HydraConnector) CheckAuthForward(reqToken string, publicKey string, host string, method string, forward string, external bool) int {
 	if forward == "" || method == "" {
-		return false
+		return http.StatusUnauthorized
+	}
+	// Defense in depth: only SELF peer requests are allowed.
+	if external {
+		return http.StatusUnauthorized
 	}
 	logger := oclib.GetLogger()

-	// Introspect the token via Hydra to get claims
+	// Introspect the token via Hydra.
+	// An inactive or invalid token means the user must re-authenticate → 401.
 	result, err := h.Introspect(reqToken)
 	if err != nil || !result.Active {
 		if err != nil {
 			logger.Error().Msg("Forward auth introspect failed: " + err.Error())
 		}
-		return false
+		return http.StatusUnauthorized
 	}

-	// Extract claims from the introspection result's extra data
-	// Hydra puts consent session's access_token data in the "ext" field of introspection
+	// Build session claims from Hydra's introspection "ext" field.
+	// Hydra injects the consent session's access_token data there.
 	var sessionClaims claims.Claims
+	sessionClaims.Session.AccessToken = make(map[string]interface{})
+	sessionClaims.Session.IDToken = make(map[string]interface{})
 	if result.Extra != nil {
-		sessionClaims.Session.AccessToken = make(map[string]interface{})
-		sessionClaims.Session.IDToken = make(map[string]interface{})
 		for k, v := range result.Extra {
 			sessionClaims.Session.AccessToken[k] = v
 		}
 	}

-	// Also try to get id_token claims from the token if it's a JWT
-	// For now, use the introspected extra claims and the peer signature verification
-	if sessionClaims.Session.IDToken == nil {
-		sessionClaims.Session.IDToken = make(map[string]interface{})
-	}
-
-	// Get self peer for signature verification
+	// For SELF peer requests skip the signature check (internal traffic).
 	pp := oclib.NewRequest(oclib.LibDataEnum(oclib.PEER), "", "", []string{}, nil).Search(nil, fmt.Sprintf("%v", peer.SELF.EnumIndex()), false)
 	if len(pp.Data) > 0 {
 		p := pp.Data[0].(*peer.Peer)
-		// Re-sign for local verification if this is our own peer
-		if !external && p.PublicKey == publicKey {
+		if p.PublicKey == publicKey {
 			sessionClaims.Session.IDToken["signature"] = ""
-			// For internal requests, skip signature check by using the claims decoder directly
-			ok, err := claims.GetClaims().DecodeClaimsInToken(host, method, forward, sessionClaims, publicKey, external)
-			if err != nil {
-				logger.Error().Msg("Failed to decode claims: " + err.Error())
-			}
-			return ok
 		}
 	}

+	// Check permissions via Keto.
+	// A valid token with insufficient permissions → 403 (authenticated, not authorized).
 	ok, err := claims.GetClaims().DecodeClaimsInToken(host, method, forward, sessionClaims, publicKey, external)
 	if err != nil {
-		logger.Error().Msg("Failed to decode claims: " + err.Error())
+		logger.Error().Msg("Failed to decode claims in forward auth: " + err.Error())
+		return http.StatusForbidden
 	}
-	return ok
+	if !ok {
+		return http.StatusForbidden
+	}
+	return http.StatusOK
 }

 // extractBearerToken extracts the token from a "Bearer xxx" Authorization header value
--- a/infrastructure/perms_connectors/keto_connector.go
+++ b/infrastructure/perms_connectors/keto_connector.go
@@ -370,17 +370,20 @@ func (k KetoConnector) createRelationShip(object string, relation string, subjec
 		log.Error().Msgf("createRelationShip unmarshal error: %s, err=%v", string(b), err)
 		return nil, 500, err
 	}
-	perm := &Permission{
-		Object:   data["object"].(string),
-		Relation: data["relation"].(string),
-		Subject:  data["subject_id"].(string),
-	}
-	if data["subject_set"] != nil {
-		sub := data["subject_set"].(map[string]interface{})
-		perm.SubPermission = &Permission{
-			Object:   sub["object"].(string),
-			Relation: sub["relation"].(string),
-			Subject:  sub["subject_id"].(string),
+	perm := &Permission{}
+	if data != nil {
+		perm = &Permission{
+			Object:   data["object"].(string),
+			Relation: data["relation"].(string),
+			Subject:  data["subject_id"].(string),
+		}
+		if data["subject_set"] != nil {
+			sub := data["subject_set"].(map[string]interface{})
+			perm.SubPermission = &Permission{
+				Object:   sub["object"].(string),
+				Relation: sub["relation"].(string),
+				Subject:  sub["subject_id"].(string),
+			}
 		}
 	}
 	return perm, 200, nil
--- a/main.go
+++ b/main.go
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ import (
 	"oc-auth/infrastructure"
 	auth_connectors "oc-auth/infrastructure/auth_connector"
 	_ "oc-auth/routers"
+	"strings"
 	"time"

 	oclib "cloud.o-forge.io/core/oc-lib"
@@ -40,9 +41,15 @@ func main() {
 	conf.GetConfig().PermissionConnectorReadHost = o.GetStringDefault("PERMISSION_CONNECTOR_READ_HOST", "keto")
 	conf.GetConfig().PermissionConnectorPort = o.GetStringDefault("PERMISSION_CONNECTOR_PORT", "4466")
 	conf.GetConfig().PermissionConnectorAdminPort = o.GetStringDefault("PERMISSION_CONNECTOR_ADMIN_PORT", "4467")
+
+	conf.GetConfig().Origin = o.GetStringDefault("ADMIN_ORIGIN", "http://localhost:8000")
+	conf.GetConfig().AdminOrigin = o.GetStringDefault("ADMIN_ORIGIN", "http://localhost:8001")
+
+	conf.GetConfig().OAuthRedirectURI = o.GetStringDefault("OAUTH_REDIRECT_URI", "http://google.com")
+	conf.GetConfig().OAdminAuthRedirectURI = o.GetStringDefault("ADMIN_OAUTH_REDIRECT_URI", "http://chatgpt.com")
 	conf.GetConfig().Local = o.GetBoolDefault("LOCAL", true)

-	// config LDAP
+	// config LDAPauth
 	conf.GetConfig().SourceMode = o.GetStringDefault("SOURCE_MODE", "ldap")
 	conf.GetConfig().LDAPEndpoints = o.GetStringDefault("LDAP_ENDPOINTS", "ldap:389")
 	conf.GetConfig().LDAPBindDN = o.GetStringDefault("LDAP_BINDDN", "cn=admin,dc=example,dc=com")
@@ -100,17 +107,23 @@ func discovery() {
 		logger.Info().Msg("Starting permission discovery")
 		_, _, err := conn.CreateRole(conf.GetConfig().AdminRole)
 		if err != nil {
-			logger.Error().Msg("Failed to create admin role, retrying in 10s: " + err.Error())
-			time.Sleep(10 * time.Second)
-			continue
+			if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "already exist") {
+				logger.Error().Msg("Failed to create admin role, retrying in 10s: " + err.Error())
+				time.Sleep(10 * time.Second)
+				continue
+			}
+		}
+		if _, _, err := conn.BindRole(conf.GetConfig().AdminRole, "admin"); err != nil {
+			logger.Error().Msg("Failed to admin bind role: " + err.Error())
 		}
-		conn.BindRole(conf.GetConfig().AdminRole, "admin")
 		addPermissions := func(m tools.NATSResponse) {
 			var resp map[string][]interface{}
 			json.Unmarshal(m.Payload, &resp)
 			for k, v := range resp {
 				for _, p := range v {
-					conn.CreatePermission(k, p.(string), true)
+					if _, _, err := conn.CreatePermission(k, p.(string), true); err != nil {
+						logger.Error().Msg("Failed to admin create permission: " + err.Error())
+					}
 				}
 			}
 		}
--- a/BIN
+++ b/BIN
--- a/swagger/swagger.json
+++ b/swagger/swagger.json
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@
                "tags": [
                    "oc-auth/controllersOAuthController"
                ],
-                "description": "Forward auth for Traefik — validates JWT via Hydra introspection\n\u003cbr\u003e",
+                "description": "Forward auth for Traefik — validates JWT via Hydra introspection.\n\u003cbr\u003e",
                "operationId": "OAuthController.AuthForward",
                "parameters": [
                    {
@@ -798,11 +798,11 @@
        }
    },
    "definitions": {
-        "2111.0xc0004ce750.false": {
+        "2432.0xc000460e70.false": {
            "title": "false",
            "type": "object"
        },
-        "3850.0xc0004ce930.false": {
+        "4171.0xc000461050.false": {
            "title": "false",
            "type": "object"
        },
@@ -821,7 +821,7 @@
                    "format": "int64"
                },
                "ext": {
-                    "$ref": "#/definitions/3850.0xc0004ce930.false"
+                    "$ref": "#/definitions/4171.0xc000461050.false"
                },
                "scope": {
                    "type": "string"
@@ -842,7 +842,7 @@
                    "type": "string"
                },
                "client": {
-                    "$ref": "#/definitions/2111.0xc0004ce750.false"
+                    "$ref": "#/definitions/2432.0xc000460e70.false"
                },
                "request_url": {
                    "type": "string"
--- a/swagger/swagger.yml
+++ b/swagger/swagger.yml
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ paths:
      tags:
      - oc-auth/controllersOAuthController
      description: |-
-        Forward auth for Traefik — validates JWT via Hydra introspection
+        Forward auth for Traefik — validates JWT via Hydra introspection.
        <br>
      operationId: OAuthController.AuthForward
      parameters:
@@ -593,10 +593,10 @@ paths:
        "200":
          description: ""
 definitions:
-  2111.0xc0004ce750.false:
+  2432.0xc000460e70.false:
    title: "false"
    type: object
-  3850.0xc0004ce930.false:
+  4171.0xc000461050.false:
    title: "false"
    type: object
  auth_connectors.IntrospectResult:
@@ -611,7 +611,7 @@ definitions:
        type: integer
        format: int64
      ext:
-        $ref: '#/definitions/3850.0xc0004ce930.false'
+        $ref: '#/definitions/4171.0xc000461050.false'
      scope:
        type: string
      sub:
@@ -625,7 +625,7 @@ definitions:
      challenge:
        type: string
      client:
-        $ref: '#/definitions/2111.0xc0004ce750.false'
+        $ref: '#/definitions/2432.0xc000460e70.false'
      request_url:
        type: string
      session_id: